Introduction
A key component of Hanford Site cleanup is the Waste Retrieval Project (WRP) within the Waste Stabilization and Disposition Project. The scope of the WRP is to remove or retrieve, classify, and characterize suspect TRU solid wastes buried between 1970 and 1987 on the Hanford Site. Suspect TRU waste was received from many different on-site and off-site waste generators. Documentation on each waste generator is compiled into an Acceptable Knowledge (AK) data package. Radioassay of up to 5,000 retrieved waste containers (primarily 210 liter (55-gallon) drums) per year is the critical step in classification of the waste as TRU or LLW.
History of the Hanford Site and various nuclear programs may be tracked through the WM'06 Conference, February 26 - March 2,2006 , Tucson, Az I identificationof radionuclides in the suspect TRU waste. Initially, most retrieved waste containers were in good condition. However, for badly corroded containers, or containers with illegible markings, or containers with no labels, radioassay provides a useful tool to attempt to associate the waste container with the correct AK documentation to identify the waste generator.
Wastes are considered unknown when they cannot be associated with the burial records or AK documentation. A few of the varied waste processes and radionuclide mixtures are described below:
Weapons, fuel, and research-grade plutonium containing up to 23 percent Pu-240. Curium and plutonium-238 heat source material. Plutonium-uranium mixed oxide (MOX). This waste stream consists of fucl rod cladding and cans, and MOX fuel in the form of pellets, powder, and scrap (waste from the production of MOX). There is significantly more uranium than plutonium.
Waste associated with the recovery of special nuclear materials including americium, curium, and californium. Waste from research and development of plutonium-bearing fuels including metallurgical examination and chemical separation of materials. Actinide separation studies including thorium and neptunium separations. Specific isotope isolation such as curium and promethium isotopes. Thorium-232 uranium-233 fuel cycle.
Suspect TRU Wastes were placed in burial trenches from 1970 through 1987 for future retrieval. Figure 1 . In older situations, the drum might be identified to a particuIar module or set of geographic coordinates without identifying a specific position in the module. This system of module charts provides an effective tool in associating a retrieved waste container with the correct burial record and in resolving unknown containers when a drum is removed without legible labels or markings. The primary DQO or project goal is to ensure TRU wastes are never rnisclassified as LLW. The project employs a number of quality checks and project tools to verify and validate the accuracy of waste classification data. Traditional quality control checks such as control charting radioassay parameters are performed to ensure the assay system is operating properly. In addition, periodic indcpcndcnt assessments, surveillances, reviews, and assay of test standards are performed to validate and verify system operation. Radioassay measuremcnts are pcrformed in the field with mobile equipment to sort TRU from LLW. Based on field assay results, suspect TRU waste is separated into two pathways. TRU waste containers receive a certified radioassay to support disposal of the waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. The non-TRU waste stream is treated and disposed of on-site, according to reguIatory requirements.
As an example, one mixed LLW stream is super-compacted and macroencapsulated (grouted) in a waste box for disposal on-site. Approximately 47-percent of the retrieved suspect TRU waste is classified by radioassay as LLW.
Project Approach and Controls
Project management techniques are employed lo ensure effective and eflicient management of Regulatory requirements specific to classification of waste for disposal have been developed through a Sample Analysis Plan [4] and DQO process [S]. The DQO process defines the required decisions and data needed to disposition the waste. In addition, various daily quality controls checks are routinely performed to ensure the radioassay system is operating properly.
Identification of Unknown Waste Containers
Unknown wastes are defined as waste containers that are removed from the burial grounds without legible labels or markings such that the contents of the container cannot be identified or associated with its corresponding records or acceptable knowledge data package. Identification and efficient resolution of unknown waste containers is important to minimize project costs for handling unknown conditions. Research and identification of an unknown waste is analogous to an archeological excavation using carbon-14 dating to determine information about the site. In most cases, a simple records search and comparison can bc used to identify or resolve an unknown waste. In more complex situations radioassay data can be used to resolve unknown waste containers.
A module usually contains 12 drums across the front, 12 drums wide and 4 drums high (see Figure 1 ) or a total of 576 drums. In the simple case, one drum might be an unknown waste container. This scenario is easily resolved by matching the burial records against the unknown container in the module. When a module is found with multiple unknown containers, in some cases a process of elimination is used to match the container coordinates, location, or burial date against the records. Knowing that a group of drums was received and buried on the same date is onen enough to identify the unknown container. These simple techniques have resolved many unknown containers. Finally, the situation may exist where the total plutonium activity in a waste as determined by radioassay and the process of elimination does not resolve the identity of an unknown waste container. In this case, further review of the radioassay results may be used to identify the waste generator. As noted and described in the next section, numerous on-site and off-site waste generators have used the Hanford Site for the disposition of suspect TRU waste. With a few exceptions, most of these waste generators processed radioactive material with a standard isotopic mixture. For example, the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) typically processed plutonium at 6 and I2 % plutonium-240. In cases where the isotopic mixture can be identified it may be used to identify an unknown waste container.
In some cases, due to conflicting radioactivity and high activity levels in the waste, assay results are indeterminant for the purpose of segregating TRU from LLW. Figure 2 depicts a gamma spectrum where it is not possible to discern the TRU radionuclide concentration below 100 nCi/g. In this specific case, this drum contained excessive cesium-137 and some cobalt40 which masked the plutonium signal. The blue vertical line in Figure 2 is a marker corresponding to the 413.71 keV plutonium-239 peak. The red curve in Figure 2 depicts the gamma spectrum for this waste drum. The point where the blue and red lines intersect corresponds to a minimum detectable activity for Pu-239 at a TRU concentration greater than 100 nCi1g. The drum may be LLW but it is not possible to see the actual TRU concentration or plutonium activity at a level below 100 nCi/g to verify a LLW classification. Indeterminant assays are handled as TRU waste and sent to another facility for further nondestructive analysis and processing.
During retrieval of suspect TRU waste from the WRP, over 12,000 drums have been removed from the burial trenches. Forty-nine of these drums identified as unknown drums have been resolved by the techniques described above. This avoids the cost of characterizing the unknown waste, and these containers are now processed as part of their respective waste streams.
Fig. 2. Radioassay gamma spectrum showing indeterminant results
On-site and Off-sitc Wastc Generators Suspect TRU waste was received from many different on-site and off-site waste generators. Documentation on each waste generator is compiled into an Acceptable Knowledge (AK) data package. Each waste generator has certain of its history that can be traced or identified through radioassay. The next section provides greater detail and describes historical perspective on five of the waste generators, based on the gamma signature of the suspect TRU waste. Table I provides a list of suspcct TRU waste generators that are associated with the WRP. The gamma spectrum for a subset of these waste generators from Table I is presented as a signature or method for relating the waste to the waste generator. This section provides greater detail and describes historical perspective on five of the waste generators based on the gamma signature of the suspect TRU waste. The gamma spectrum is presented by plotting counts versus energy. Plutonium isotopic mixtures can range from approximately 1 % Pu-240 through 6,12, and 23 % Pu-240. Initially, uranium was irradiated for very short periods to produce super grade weapons plutonium containing 0.9 % Pu-240. Later, weapons programs were optimized to produce weapons grade plutonium at 6 % Pu-240. Fuels grade plutonium at 12 % Pu-240 was produced for breeder and other reactor programs. Rescarch grade plutonium contains greater than 12 % Pu-240 and is frequently found at 18 to 23 % Pu-240. Table I1 provides the standard 20-year decayed plutonium mass distributions for 6, 12, and 23 % Pu-240 [6], These mixtures can be used to identify the origin of the waste.
Generally, the isotopic ratio used during radioassay is based on the AK data package from the nuclear material accountability records. Accountability records includc the nuclear material item transfer or nuclear material transaction report (DOEMRC Form 741). When enough plutonium is present in the waste container, radioassay is used to determine or confirm the isotopic ratios. However, for the WRP, the drums planned for assay (those with records showing 1 gram .plutonium or less) seldom have sufficient plutonium and the isotopic ratios are based on the records. In the case where the ratio is not known the next higher ratio is used. For example, waste containers with records indicating 6.21 %to 13 % Pu-240 are assigned the isotopics for 12 % Pu-240. For a facility like the Plutonium Finishing Plant which is known to process 6 % and 12 % material, an unknown drum would be assigned the 12 % Pu-240 isotopic composition. This effectively over estimates the TRU radionuclide concentration in the waste container and helps to ensure a TRU waste is never mis-classified as LLW.
Thorium-232 and Uranium-233
Thorium-232 is a naturally occurring radioactive isotope. There are many uses for thorium including the development of a thorium-232 uranium-233 fuel cycle. During 1965 During -1966 , an experimental processing of commercial thorium nitrate into thorium oxide powder was carried out in the Hanford Uranium Oxide (U03) Plant, using the old electric pot calciners. The goal of this work was to produce thorium oxide powder suitable for fabrication into reactor target elements for U-233 production [7, 9] . However, for reasons unrelated to the U03 Plant, the use of thorium oxide powder was abandoned at the Hanford Site, in favor of experiments with thorium wafer targets [9, 10] . Th-232 is identified through radioassay by AN TECH^ by the 238.6,583.3, and 91 1.3 keV peaks. Thorium materials have been handled through many nuclear Figure 3 depicts a gamma spectrum from a drum showing a significant quantity of neptunium-237. Np-237 is identified by the 300.14 and 312.17 keV peaks. Original records for this particular drum show 14 grams Np-237 and enriched uranium at 99.8 % U-235. Radioassay identified 3 grams Np-237 and 9 grams of U-235. These isotopes are readily discernable in the gamma spectrum. Methods for producing and separating Np-237 are described in Hanford Reaclor and Separations Facility Advantages [9] . Np-237 was separated at Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Facility and processed through the glovebox in Q cell. The waste depicted in Figure 3 , generated from the High Temperature Lattice Test Reactor, 318 Facility, by Battelle Northwest Laboratory, is described as plastic bags containing miscellaneous sliplid metal cans and plastic bags with source material randomly distributed. This drum is identified as TRU waste and will bc certified for disposal at the WIPP. Promethium-146 is an unusual isotope to see in lhe suspect TRU wastes and clearly marks this waste as originating from the research facilities at Battelle Northwest Laboratories. Figure 4 shows a gamma spectrum for a TRU drum from the 325 Radiochemistry Building. The blue vertical line in Figure 4 is a marker'corresponding to the 41 3.71 keV plutonium-239 peak. This drum is classified as TRU waste at about 1600 nCilg based on the plutonium-239 peak. Promethium-146 is identified in the waste drum by the 747.24,735.93,453.88, and 633.25 keV peaks and two low abundance peaks(589.8 & 146.2 keV) in the gamma spectrum. This drum also contains curium-244. Promethium is a rare-earth element produced by fission of uranium or by neutron bombardment of neodymium. It is not naturally occurring and was first separated from man-made products in 1963. Promethium was also recovered from Shippingport Reactor Fuel reprocessing wastes at the Hanford Site [8, 9] . Cobalt40 and Cesium-137 Sources Figure 6 depicts the gamma spectrum for a suspect TRU drum from the Westinghouse Hanford Company, 340 Facility. Normally, these drums will exhibit the characteristic gamma spectrum for plutonium at 6 % or 12 % Pu-240. The blue vertical line in Figure 4 is a marker corresponding to the 413.71 keV plutonium-239 peak. In this case there are no plutonium peaks identified above the minimum detectable activity, so this drum is classified as LLW at 74 nCi/g based on the plutonium MDA values. However, the Cs-137 and Co-60 peaks are readily identified as the only significant activity in this drum, and it appears that small radioactive sources were disposed in the waste. The non-TRU waste stream is treated and disposed of onsite, according to regulatory requirements. As an example of treatment, one mixed LLW stream is super-compacted m d macroencapsulated (grouted) in a waste box for disposal on-site. 
PROJEC'I~C~IALLENGES
~u h e n t waste retrieval activities are centered in the 218-W-4C burial ground. At the start of the WRP the 218-W-4C burial ground had approximately 3.732 m3 of suspect TRU waste in drums and 3,359 m3 suspect TRU in other containers such as metal and fiber reinforced plastic boxes. Three other burial grounds are planned for retrieval and removal of the suspect TRU waste. The 218-E-128 buriaI ground contains approximately 638 m3 of suspect TRU from the Hanford's PUREX Facility waste generator buried between 1970 and 1972. Due to fission products in the PUREX waste stream, this burial ground will require the use of a combination of gamma and neutron radioassay detector systems in order to adequately characterize the waste. The 218-W-3A burial ground contains approximately 4,104 m3 suspect TRU waste buried between 1970 and 1984. This burial ground presents challenges for retrieval due to the age and degradation of the waste containers and waste form (lab packed liquids etc.). The final burial ground 218-W-4B for retrieval contains approximately 3,219 r n ' suspect TRU waste. This burial ground presents challenges due to the unique manner in which drums were stacked in a "V" arrangement. Some of the older waste is identified in the burial records as remote handled waste and is not suitable for current radioassay techniques. Overall, the major challenge confronting radioassay is throughput capability to assay up to 5,000 containers pcr year.
